Consider a communication network represented by a directed graph G = (V, E ), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of point-to-point channels in the network. On the network a secure message M is transmitted, and there may exist wiretappers who want to obtain information about the message. In secure network coding, we aim to find a network code which can protect the message against the wiretapper whose power is constrained. Cai and Yeung [6] studied the model in which the wiretapper can access any one but not more than one set of channels, called a wiretap set, out of a collection A of all possible wiretap sets. In order to protect the message, the message needs to be mixed with a random key K. They proved tight fundamental performance bounds when A consists of all subsets of E of a fixed size r. In this paper, we investigate the problem when A consists of arbitrary subsets of E and obtain the following results: 1) an upper bound on H(M ); 2) a lower bound on H(K) in terms of H(M ). The upper bound on H(M ) is explicit, while the lower bound on H(K) can be computed in polynomial time. The tightness of the lower bound for the point-to-point communication system is also proved.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N classical information-theoretic cryptography, when we need to send a private message to a receiver in the presence of wiretappers, in order to protect the message, we encrypt the message with a random key and send the ciphertext to the receiver. A wiretapper who has no access to the key can know nothing about the message by only observing the ciphertext, in the sense that the ciphertext and the message are statistically independent. On the other hand, the receiver obtains the key via a "secure" channel and use it to decrypt the ciphertext to recover the private message. The best known such model is the one-time pad system studied by Shannon [22] , which requires the minimal amount of randomness for the key.
The one-time pad system was generalized to secret sharing by Blakley [4] and Shamir [21] . Ozarow and Wyner [19] also studied a similar problem which they called the wiretap channel II. In this model, information is sent to the receiver through a number of point-to-point channels. It is assumed that the wiretapper can access any one but not more than one set of channels, called a wiretap set, out of a collection A of all possible wiretap sets, where A is specified by the problem under consideration. For example, A could be the collection of all wiretap sets each containing a single channel. In this case, the wiretapper can access any one but not more than one channel. The strategy to protect the private message is the same as that in classical information-theoretic cryptography. Specifically, the private message and the random key are combined by means of a coding scheme, so that a wiretapper observes some mixtures of the message and the key, where these mixtures are statistically independent of the message. On the other hand, the receiver node can decode the message from the information received on all the channels.
Cai and Yeung [6] generalized secret sharing to secure network coding, in which a private message is sent to possibly more than one receiver through a network of point-to-point channels. The model they studied, which we refer to as the wiretap network (see also El Rouayheb and Soljanin [20] ), is described as follows. In this model, the assumptions about the wiretapper and the strategy to protect the private message are the same as in the wiretap channel II. The only difference is that there exist intermediate nodes in the network that can encode, and there may be more than one receiver node. The solution is that we send both the private message and the key via a network coding scheme, so that a wiretapper can only observe some mixtures of the message and the key, where the mixtures are statistically independent of the message. On the other hand, a receiver node can recover the private message by decoding the information received from its input channels. Note that when A is the empty set, the wiretap network reduces to the original network coding model studied in Ahlswede et al. [1] .
In [6] , a condition for the existence of secure linear network codes was proved and a construction of such codes was proposed. Feldman et al. [9] proved an equivalent existence condition and extended the code construction in [6] . In [20] , El Rouayheb and Soljanin regarded the secure network coding problem as a network generalization of the model in wiretap channel II and showed that the transmitted information can be secured by using the coset coding scheme in [19] at the source on top of the existing network code. Moreover, their code is equivalent to the code in [6] . In Silva and Kschischang [23] , a universal coding scheme based on the approach in [20] was proposed to apply on top of any communication network without requiring the knowledge of the underlying network code. In Cai & Yeung [5] and Zhang & Yeung [28] , a general security condition for multi-source network code was presented.
The performance of a secure network coding scheme is measured by two quantities: the size of the message and the size of the key. In designing a secure network coding scheme, we want to maximize the size of the message and at the same time minimize the size of the key. The latter is necessary because in cryptography, randomness is regarded as a resource. In [6] , it was shown that when the collection A of all wiretap sets consists of all subsets of channels whose sizes are at most some constant r, an upper bound on the size of the message and a lower bound on the size of the random key were obtained. Both of these bounds are tight for this special case. In this paper, we extend these bounds to the general case.
When A is arbitrary, Cui et al. [8] studied the secrecy capacity under the wiretap network model. They showed that the cut-set bound is not achievable in general when the wiretap set is unknown, whereas it is achievable when the wiretap set is known before the communication. Some achievable strategies are proposed and the computational complexity to determine the secrecy capacity is proved to be NP-hard.
Secure network coding was also generalized from different perspectives. Bhattad and Narayanan [3] introduced weakly secure network coding, where it is required that wiretappers cannot decode any part of the source message. In this model, a weakly secure network code can be used to avoid trading off the throughput. In [11] , Harada and Yamamoto studied the strongly r-secure linear network code which can protect the source message such that a wiretapper can obtain no information about any s components of the source message by accessing n − s channels provided that the maximum flows to all the sink nodes are at least n, where s ≤ n − r. A polynomial-time algorithm was proposed to construct the strongly r-secure linear network code. They also showed that strong security contains weak security as a special case.
Secure network coding with error correction was studied by Ngai and Yeung [18] , where they proposed a construction of secure error-correcting (SEC) network code which can protect the message from wiretapping, random errors and errors injected by the wiretapper. They further showed the optimality of their construction.
From a different point of view, Lima et al. [16] analyzed the security of the network with the assumption that all the nodes comply with the communication protocol, but yet are potential eavesdroppers. In Jaggi et al. [13] and Ho et al. [12] , detection of Byzantine attacks in the network coding framework was discussed.
For practical scenarios, secure network coding for multi-resolution wireless video streaming was considered in Lima et al. [15] . A joint investigation of network cost and network security was presented in Tan and Mèdard [24] . They also presented some experimental results regarding the tradeoff between network cost and network security.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this work, we focus on the wiretap network model proposed in [6] and aim to obtain some new performance bounds. Denote the network by G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges, each representing a point-to-point channel in the network. In this work, we use the terms "edge" and "channel" interchangeably. On each edge e a symbol from some transmission alphabet F can be transmitted. In this sense we say that each channel has unit capacity. We assume that G is a directed acyclic multigraph, namely there can be multiple edges between each pair of nodes.
A wiretap network consists of the following components: 1) Source node s: The node set V contains a node s, called the source node, where a random message M taking values in an alphabet M, called the message set, is generated. 2) Set of user nodes U: A user node is a node in V which is fully accessed by a legal user who is required to receive the random message M with zero error. There is generally more than one user node in a network. The set of user nodes is denoted by U. For each u ∈ U, let maxflow (u) denote the value of a maximum flow from the source node s to node u. 3) Collection of sets of wiretap edges A: A is a collection of arbitrary subsets of the edge set E. Each wiretapper can access any A ∈ A but not more than one subset in A at the same time. We denote such a wiretap network by the tuple (G, s, U, A).
A. Admissible Code
We assume that the message M is generated at the source node according to an arbitrary distribution on the message set M. Let K be a random variable independent of M , called the key, that takes values in an alphabet K according to the uniform distribution.
For each node v of the network G, we denote the set of the input edges and the set of the output edges of v by In(v) and Out(v), respectively. A code for a wiretap network consists of a set of local encoding mappings {φ e : e ∈ E} such that for all e, φ e is a function from M × K to F if e ∈ Out(s), and is a function from F |In(t)| to F if e ∈ Out (t ) for t = s. For e ∈ E, let Y e be the random symbol in F transmitted on channel e; i.e., the value of φ e . For a subset B of E, denote (Y e : e ∈ B) by Y B .
To complete the description of a code, we have to specify the order in which the channels send the indices, called the encoding order. Since the graph G is acyclic, it defines a partial order on the node set V. Then the nodes in V can be indexed in a way such that for two nodes t and t ′ , if there is a channel from node t to node t ′ , then t < t ′ . According to this indexing, node t sends indices in its output channels before node t ′ if and only if t < t ′ . The order in which the channels within the set of output channels of a node send the indices is immaterial. The important point here is that whenever a channel sends an index, all the indices necessary for encoding have already been received. A code defined as such induces a function Φ u from M × K to F |In(u)| for all user nodes u ∈ U, where the value of Φ u denotes the indices received by the user node u in its input channels.
In the wiretap network model, a code {φ e : e ∈ E} should satisfy the following two conditions: 1) decodable condition: For all user node u ∈ U and all m, m ′ ∈ M with m = m ′ ,
for all k, k ′ ∈ K. This guarantees that any two message are distinguishable at every user node. 2) secure condition: the message should be information-theoretic secure, namely for all A ∈ A,
We refer to a code satisfying 1) and 2) as an admissible code.
For an admissible code, we focus on the following two performance parameters, the size of the message and the size of the key:
1) the size of the message is measured by H(M ), which should be maximized; 2) the size of the key is measured by H(K), which should be minimized.
B. Related Works
For set A ⊆ B, if |A| = r, then we refer to it as an r-subset of B. In [6] , the following result was obtained.
Theorem 1.
Let q be the size of the transmission alphabet F , A consist of all the r-subsets of E and n = min u∈U maxflow(u). However, when A consists of arbitrary subsets of E, the problem becomes very hard and very little is known about the fundamental performance limit. In this work, we investigate this problem and obtain some bounds.
III. BLOCKING SETS AND WIRETAP SETS
In this section, we introduce some notations and theorems in our proof. We first state in the next lemma two key inequalities obtained in [6] .
Definition 1. For a network
G = (V, E),
Lemma 1. In the network
If there exists an admissible code on G, then for any wiretap set I ⊆ E W , we have
The inequality (A 1 ) was used in [6] to prove 1) and 2) of Theorem 1. The inequality (A 2 ) was proved but no further interpretation was provided. In this section, we extend these two inequalities to a more general situation.
Definition 2. In the network G = (V, E), a set J ⊆ E is called a blocking set if and only if there exists a cut
The blocking set is a generalization of the graph cut. Let u ∈ U. Since the message M can be decoded at user node u and the symbols received at node u are functions of Y EW , where W is a cut and E W is a subset of the blocking set J, we obtain that M is a function of Y J , namely
On the other hand,
which completes the proof. The next lemma is a simple generalization of Lemma 1, which we will see is a very useful tool for obtaining performance bounds for a general secure network coding problem.
Lemma 2.
In the network G = (V, E), let J ⊆ E be a blocking set. For any admissible code on G and any wiretap set I ⊆ J, we have
Proof: Since J is a blocking set, we obtain that
Since I ⊆ J is a wiretap set and the code is secure, we have
It follows that
which completes the proof of (B 1 ).
which completes the proof of (B 2 ).
IV. AN UPPER BOUND ON THE MESSAGE SIZE
From Lemma 2, we can immediately obtain an upper bound on H(M ).
Corollary 1.
Let the size of the transmission alphabet F be q. Let J be a blocking set and I ⊆ J be a wiretap set. For any admissible code on G,
Proof: By (B 1 ) of Lemma 2, we have
Then the corollary is proved by minimizing over all J, I such that I ⊆ J.
From this bound, we see that if J \ I = ∅, then the upper bound above vanishes, which implies H(M ) = 0. This means that if there exists a wiretap set I that contains a cut as its subset, then the network cannot send any message, because J can be taken to be I so that |J \ I| = 0.
Next we present two theorems for computing the upper bound on H(M ).
Lemma 3. For any fixed wiretap set I, min
where mincut(E \ I) is the minimum cut of graph (V, E \ I).
Proof: Let (W, W c ) be a graph cut and E W be the edges across the cut. Then J W = E W I is a blocking set. If we consider only such blocking sets J W for J in (7), we have
The last equation is due to the fact that E W \ I corresponds to the set of edges across a cut of E \ I, and vice versa. Conversely, let J 0 be a blocking set including I that minimizes |J \ I|, and E W ⊆ J 0 . Then
Together with (8), we can conclude the proof. From Lemma 3, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. min
By means of this corollary, since the mincut of a graph can be computed in O(|V| · |E|) number of steps, we can compute the upper bound on H(M ) in Corollary 1 in O(|I| · |V| · |E|) number of steps.
V. INFORMATION INEQUALITIES FOR JOINT ENTROPY
In this section, we state and explain some information inequalities that are instrumental in the proofs in this work.
In information theory, the following independence bound for joint entropy (e.g, p. 29 in [26] ) is well known.
This inequality provides an upper bound on the joint entropy H(X [n] ) in terms of the entropies of the individual random variables. It is tight when the random variables X 1 , ..., X n are mutually independent.
A. Han's Inequalities
Han [10] generalized the independence bound to two sequences of inequalities, which are stated in the next two theorems.
In this theorem,
is equivalent to the independence bound. This sequence of inequalities was used in [27] to prove a converse coding theorem in multilevel diversity coding.
This sequence of inequalities was used in proving 2) in Theorem 1.
B. Madiman-Tetali's Inequalities
In Han's inequalities, the term H k (H ′ k ) only involves the joint entropy (conditional joint entropy) of the k-subsets of X [n] . These inequalities have recently been generalized by Madiman and Tetali [17] . In the following, let C be an arbitrary collection of subsets of [n]. 
In the rest of this work, we refer to the left hand side of the inequality as the fractional packing inequality and the right hand side of the inequality as the fractional covering inequality.
By Han's inequalities, we obtain that
By Madiman-Tetali's inequalities, we obtain that
holds for any fractional covering α and any fractional packing β, namely
In particular, when α i = 
where
Recently, Jiang et al. [14] have applied these inequalities to multilevel diversity coding.
VI. THE FRACTIONAL PACKING BOUND
In this section, we prove a lower bound on H(K) by means of the fractional packing inequality in (12).
Theorem 4.
Fix a blocking set J and let β be a fractional packing of {J \ I : I ⊆ J}, then
By inequality (12), we obtain
Hence,
Then,
This implies,
Since (20) holds for any fractional packing β, we have
which completes the proof. In order to evaluate the lower bound on H(K), we need to consider the following LP (linear program),
s.t. I⊆J:i∈J\I β(J \ I) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ J. In the following discussion, we define τ (J) = max Conversely, assume that for all e ∈ J, it is covered by at least one wiretap set. Fix e, and we can assume that, without lost of generality, e ∈ I 1 . Then we have e / ∈ J \ I 1 , implying that the number of sets J \ I j (j = 1) which cover e is at most
In the network G = (V, E), when we try to find the lower bound on
, if an edge e = (u, v) ∈ E is not covered by any wiretap set, we can directly send messages from u to v through e without mixing them with any key. By this means, we can merge nodes u, v into a new node v 0 , and delete all the edges between u and v. If we repeat this procedure, we can eliminate all such edges. Therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that each edge is covered by at least one wiretap set.
VII. AN ALTERNATIVE BOUND
In the last section, we proved a lower bound on H(K) in terms of fractional packings of {J \ I : I ⊆ J} for all blocking sets J. In this section, we prove an alternative lower bound on H(K) in terms of fractional coverings of {I : I ⊆ J}. In the next section, we prove a duality result between fractional packing and fractional covering that implies the equivalence of these two bounds. In this section, we derive another lower bound on H(K).
Fix a blocking set J. By (B 2 ) of Lemma 2, for any wiretap set I ⊆ J, we have
Let α be a fractional covering of {I : I ⊆ J}. By the fractional covering inequality in (12), we obtain that
Together with (18), we further obtain
Then
Maximizing over all β and minimizing over all α, we obtain another lower bound on H(K) for a fixed J:
The maximization in the above has been considered in Section VI. Thus in order to evaluate the above lower bound on H(K), we also need to consider the following LP:
VIII. A DUALITY RESULT
In this section, we prove that (27) is equivalent to (16). 
Proof (Theorem 5):
In this proof, since J is fixed, we can use l C and l P instead of l C (J) and l P (J) without ambiguity. We need to prove
namely
Let I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I d be the wiretap sets in J.
(1) Let α =argmin I⊆J α(I) and α i = α(I i ), and define for
α i and β i = αi sum−1 . Next, we prove that {β i : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} is a feasible solution to the LP in (22) and β(J \ I i ) = β i . For each e ∈ J, we can assume without loss of generality that I 1 , . . . , I j are the sets containing e and I j+1 , . . . , I d be the sets not containing e. Since {α i : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} is a fractional covering,
Since for all e ∈ J, e / ∈ J \ I s ,
Since l P is the maximum value, For each e ∈ J, we can assume without loss of generality that I 1 , . . . , I j are the sets containing e and I j+1 , . . . , I d be the sets not containing e. Since {β i : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} is a fractional packing,
Since for all e ∈ J, e / ∈ J \ I s , for 1 ≤ s ≤ j and e ∈ J \ I s , for
Since l C is the minimum value,
By (31) and (32), we obtain l C l P ≥ l C + l P ≥ l C l P , namely l C l P = l C + l P , which completes the proof.
By Theorem 4 and 5, we obtain
Theorem 6. Fix a blocking set J and let α be a fractional covering of {I : I ⊆ J}, then
By (30), we can write the lower bound in Theorem 4 or 6 as
Each column of A J corresponds to a wiretap set, and each row of A J corresponds to an edge in J.
We can now write the LP in (28) and its dual as follows:
The strong duality theorem in linear programming (Theorem 13 in the appendix) states that the LP and its dual problem have the same optimal value. When we try to solve the above LP, we need to consider some special relations among the wiretap sets and the blocking sets, namely a wiretap set is a subset of another wiretap set, or a blocking set is a subset of another blocking set. We discuss these issues in the following. In the following discussion, we assume that
is not a subset of any other wiretap sets.
Corollary 5. If the blocking sets
Proof: By definition, if J ′ ⊆ J, then A J ′ is a submatrix of A J . By comparing the linear programs for J ′ and J, we notice that the two objective functions are the same, but the feasible region of J is a subset of that of J ′ , because A J ′ is a submatrix of A J . Since we need to obtain the minimum value of the objective function, we have l C (J ′ ) ≤ l C (J), where l C (J ′ ) and l C (J) are the optimal values for J ′ and J, respectively. Then τ (
, which concludes the proof.
This corollary implies that toward computing τ = max
In particular, since each blocking set contains a graph cut (also a blocking set), toward computing τ , we only need to maximize over all graph cuts between the source and destination nodes.
X. ALGORITHMS FOR COMPUTING THE LOWER BOUND
A. A Brute Force Algorithm
Based on the above discussion, we propose a brute force algorithm, namely that we enumerate all the graph cuts and solve the corresponding LPs (e.g., by the simplex algorithm). Then the time complexity is 2 |V| O(LP ), where O(LP ) is the time complexity of the LP; e.g., the interior point algorithm can terminate in O(m 2 n + m 3 ) arithmetic operations, where m is number of constraints and n is the number of variables. . In this algorithm, the total complexity is exponential, which is not practical when the problem size is large. Next we propose an algorithm which is polynomial when d is constant.
B. A Polynomial Algorithm
In this part we show that when the number of wiretap sets, d, is a constant, there exists a polynomial algorithm for computing the lower bound. In the following discussion, we use some definitions and theorems in linear optimization which are given in the appendix.
In the above brute force algorithm, we consider every blocking set J and solve the following linear program for J:
If we let
, where I d×d is the d × d identity matrix, then the above constraints can be H(M) , we need to solve the linear program to obtain the optimal value for each blocking set. Then take the minimum of these optimal values over all blocking sets to obtain the best lower bound. This can be achieved by repeating the procedure in Conclusion 1.
The method described above is inefficient because if S is a submatrix of both A ′ J1 and A ′ J2 for two different blocking sets J 1 and J 2 , the exact same processing of S would be performed twice. In the remaining of this section, we aim to improve the method by removing such redundant operations.
In the method described above, if we obtain the best lower bound on
H(M) from blocking set J, we refer to the optimal value and the optimal solution of LP (J) as the best optimal value and the best optimal solution. Recall that for each blocking set J, since J ⊆ E, A ′ J is a submatrix of A ′ E (E is a blocking set so A ′ E is defined accordingly). Then we can draw another conclusion. . By Conclusion 2, the best optimal value is min x∈Q 1 T x. If we compute the set Q by means of the prescription in Definition 5, we need to enumerate all the blocking sets, and hence the computational complexity is exponential in |E|. But we notice that matrix A ′ E has γ submatrices with dimension d × d and each of them corresponds to at most one basic feasible solution, and so |Q| ≤ γ. When d is a constant, γ is polynomial in |E|, which suggests that if we compute Q by enumerating these γ d × d submatrices, we may obtain an algorithm which is polynomial in |E|. By the definition of Q, for each d × d submatrix S, if rank(S) < d, we cannot obtain a basic solution from Sx = b S . Therefore, we only need to consider S such that 1) rank(S) = d. When S satisfies 1), Sx = b S has a unique solution, which we denote by x S . In the sequel, whenever we discuss x S , we implicitly assume that S satisfies 1), otherwise x S is undefined. If x S is feasible for some blocking set J, namely A
Condition 2. Consider the best lower bound on
2) x S ≥ 0. Let Q ′ be the set of all x S satisfying 2). Then Q ⊆ Q ′ and Q ′ can be computed in polynomial time. Now we need to solve the following problem: if x ∈ Q ′ , what is the necessary and sufficient condition for x ∈ Q? For each edge e ∈ E, let (a e ) T denote the row of A E corresponding to e. For each x S ∈ Q ′ , let F (S) = {e ∈ E|(a e ) T x S ≥ 1}.
and only if F (S) is a blocking set.
Proof: "⇒" For x S ∈ Q ′ , if x S ∈ Q, then x S is a basic feasible solution of LP (J) for some blocking set J. By A ′ J x S ≥ b J , we obtain that for each e ∈ J, (a e ) T x S ≥ 1, which means e ∈ F (S), implying J ⊆ F (S). Hence F (S) is a blocking set.
, let E S be the set consisting of all e ∈ E such that e corresponds to a row of S. By the definition of x S , we have that for each e ∈ E S , (a e ) T x S = 1, which means that e ∈ F (S),
is a basic feasible solution of LP (J), and hence x S ∈ Q.
By Theorem 8, for x S ∈ Q ′ , in order to determine whether x S ∈ Q, we only need to check whether F (S) is a blocking set. This can be done in polynomial time as follows. In the graph G = (V, E), upon deleting all the edges in F (S), we need to check whether the source node and the destination node are connected in the residual graph, which can be achieved via a Depth-First Search (DFS) algorithm (e.g., in [7] ) with time complexity O(|V| + |E|). Based on the these results, we propose Algorithm 1 on the next page for computing the lower bound on
The time complexity analysis of Algorithm 1 is as follows: 1. In step a), the time for calculating all x S is O(γ * d
3 ), where d 3 is the time for matrix inversion by Gaussian elimination. 2. In step b), in the worst case, we need to enumerate all the γ submatrices. For each submatrix S, there are at most |E| edges in F (S), and so we have to delete at most |E| edges in graph G = (V, E). The complexity for determining whether F (S) is a blocking set is O(|V| + |E|). In sum, the time complexity of this step is O(γ * (|V| + |E|)).
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing a lower bound on
, keep the matrix provided that it satisfies rank(S) = d and x S ≥ 0. b) For each S that survives in a), calculate F (S), and determine whether F (S) is a blocking set. If yes, calculate val(S) = 1 T d x S , else ignore S. c) Output S and x S that attain the minimum val(S).
3. With steps a) and b) together, the total complexity is O(γ * d 3 + γ * (|V| + |E|)) = O(|E| d (|V| + |E|)), which is polynomial when d is a constant.
XI. TIGHTNESS OF THE LOWER BOUND
In this section, we discuss tightness of the lower bound on
H(M) obtained by Algorithm 1. In Cai and Yeung [5] , a security condition for multi-source linear network coding was proved. This condition, stated in the next theorem, is instrumental in the discussion in this section. For the sake of completeness, we include a proof of this theorem.
In the sequel, let F q be a finite field of size q and F 
A. When the Best Lower bound is Zero
In this case, the lower bound on
is tight as we now show. By τ = max J τ (J) = 0, we obtain that for each blocking set J, τ (J) = 0. In Corollary 3, by letting J be an arbitrary graph cut (W, W c ) of network G = (V, E), we see that there exists an edge e ∈ E(W, W c ) such that e is not contained in any wiretap set. Hence in G = (V, E), if we delete all the edges which are contained in some wiretap sets, then the number of remaining edges in each graph cut is at least 1. By the max-flow min-cut theorem, there exists a path P from the source node to the destination node and all the edges in P are not contained in any wiretap sets. So we can send a message M along P without mixing it with a random key. For such a scheme, H(M ) > 0 and H(K) = 0, implying that the bound
B. Point-to-Point Communication System
In this section, we prove that in a point-to-point communication system, the lower bound on
H(M) is tight. Consider such a system. Let s and u be the source node and the destination node, respectively. Let h be the number of edges from node s to node u and I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I d be the wiretap sets.
We now write the LP in (28) and its dual as follows
Since the primal has an optimal solution x * , by the strong duality theorem in linear optimization (Theorem 13 in the appendix), the dual also has an optimal solution y * and 1 T x * = 1 T y * . Next we prove that the lower bound on
H(M) can be achieved, namely there exists a code such that H(M ) = (1 T y * − 1)H(K).
Proposition 2.
There exists an optimal solution y * such that all its entries are rational numbers.
Proof: By Conclusion 1, there exists an extreme point y * which is optimal. This extreme point can be obtained by solving a particular set of linear equations, whose coefficients are rational numbers. Hence we conclude that y * is also rational.
, and such that H(K) = g and H(M ) = w (where the logarithm is in the base q), and on each edge e i (1 ≤ i ≤ h), the codeword is a vector defined on F wi q . By appending to the codeword a zero vector of length w max − w i , the codeword becomes a vector in F . When w i = 0, we transmit nothing on edge e i , so we can ignore edge e i . In the following, without loss of generality, we assume that w i > 0.
Proposition 3. There exists a wiretap set I such that
ei∈I w i = g.
Proof:
Since y * is a basic feasible solution of the dual problem in (34), we can find matrix C such that
where C is an invertible h × h submatrix of A T J I h×h and n 1 + n 2 = h. In the dual problem, we can see that y 0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ R h is a feasible solution and 1
Letting I be the wiretap set that corresponds to the first row of C, we have
Without loss of generality, we can let the wiretap set I prescribed in Proposition 3 be I d = {e t+1 , e t+2 , . . . , e h }, so that the edges apart from those in I d are e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e t . Then for each I i where
for
be a w i × g matrix defined on F q to be specified later. Let the symbol transmitted on edge e i be
where Y i ∈ F wi q , 1 ≤ i ≤ t, and let
is the g × g identity matrix on F q . Namely, for t + 1 ≤ i ≤ h, the symbol transmitted on edge e i is
Let Y be the symbols transmitted on all the edges. Then we can write In the code we have constructed, we see from (39) that the g symbols of the key K are sent on the edges in I d . Therefore, I(Y I d ; M ) = 0. The following lemma, which is a refinement of Lemma 3 in [6] , is instrumental for constructing B i , 1 ≤ i ≤ t. 
Since the cardinality of a subspace in F n q is finite, we need to show that the set above is nonempty. 
by Theorem 9, for each wiretap set 
then for I i , the secure condition holds. 
